Verlag des Forschungszentrums Jülich
JUEL-3603
Such critically time-dependent inspection problems are modeled
here as two-person non-cooperative games between inspector and
inspectee. They extend over a reference time interval in which
the inspector performs k inspections and in which the inspectee
behaves illegally at most once. The inspections may or may not
lead to statistical errors of the first and second kind and the
inspectee may or may not be in a position to take advantage of
information gained during the reference time interval.
Equilibria are investigated and conditions for the existence of
deterring inspection strategies are determined.
Rothenstein, Daniel; Canty, Morton John; Avenhaus, Rudolf
Timely inspection and deterrence
54 S., 1998
Verification of compliance to formal agreements requires the
performance of inspections for detection of illegal behavior.
If the inspections are carried out in such a way that the gain
the inspectee may expect from illegal behavior is smaller than
for behaving legally, then the inspections may be said to have
deterred him from violation. Achieving deterrence is assumed
to be the primary objective of the verification regime. In
this paper inspection problems characterized additionally by a
`critical time' are considered systematically for the first
time. The critical time is the maximum time interval within
which illegal activity must be detected in order to meet the
objectives of the agreement.
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